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Abstract 
 We examine positive or negative real balance effect (or so-called Pigou effect) by falls in 
the nominal wage rate and the prices of the goods in situations where there is involuntary 
unemployment using a three-generations overlapping generations model with childhood 
period and pay-as-you go pension system for the older generation consumers. We will show 
that if the net savings of the younger generation consumers are larger than their debts due to 
consumption in their childhood period, there exists positive real balance effect and the 
employment increases by a fall in the nominal wage rate; on the other hand, if the net savings 
of the younger generation consumers are smaller than their debts, there exists negative real 
balance effect and the employment decreases by a fall in the nominal wage rate.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
 In this paper we examine positive or negative real balance effect (or so-called Pigou effect) 
by falls in the nominal wage rate and the prices of the goods in situations where there is 
involuntary unemployment. The real balance effect works when increases in the real assets 
of consumers due to falls in the nominal wage rate and the prices promote their consumption. 
Then, involuntary unemployment due to lack of demand could be reduced naturally. 
However, as Kalecki (1944) said in his comments to Pigou (1943), the real balance effect 
may not work or may work in reverse when people's debts are greater than their assets.   
 Involuntary unemployment is a phenomenon that workers are willing to work at the market 
wage or just below but are prevented by factors beyond their control, mainly, deficiency of 
aggregate demand. Umada (1997) derived an upward-sloping labor demand curve from the 
mark-up principle for firms, and argued that such an upward-sloping labor demand curve 
leads to the existence of involuntary unemployment without wage rigidity. But his model of 
firm behavior is ad-hoc1. Otaki (2009) assumes indivisibility of labor supply, and has shown 
the existence of involuntary unemployment using efficient wage bargaining according to 
McDonald and Solow (1981). The arguments of this paper do not depend on bargaining. If 
labor supply is indivisible, it may be 1 or 0. On the other hand, if it is divisible, it takes a real 
value between 0 and 1. As discussed by Otaki (2015) (Theorem 2.3) and Otaki (2012), if 
labor supply is divisible and very small, no unemployment exists2. However, we show that 
even if labor supply is divisible, unless it is so small, there may exist involuntary 
unemployment. We consider consumers’ utility maximization and firms’ profit maximization 
in an overlapping generations (OLG) model under monopolistic competition according to 
Otaki (2007, 2009, 2011, 2015). We extend Otaki’s model to a three-generations OLG model 
with a childhood period, and also we consider pay-as-you-go pension system for the older 
generation consumers. We show that in such a model there can be positive or negative real 
balance effect in situations where there is involuntary unemployment. 
 In the next section we explain the model and analyze consumers’ utility maximization and 
firms’ profit maximization. In Section 3 we show the following results (Proposition 1). 
 
1.  If the net savings of the younger generation consumers are larger than their debts due 
to consumption in their childhood period, there exists positive real balance effect and the 
employment increases by a fall in the nominal wage rate.  
 
 2.  If the net savings of the younger generation consumers are smaller than their debts, 
there exists negative real balance effect and the employment decreases by a fall in the 
nominal wage rate.  
 
2. The model and behaviors of agents 
 
 
1  Lavie (2001) presented a similar analysis. 
2 About indivisible labor supply also please see Hansen (1985). In Tanaka (2020a), (2020b), (2020c) involuntary 
unemployment under indivisible labor supply is analyzed. 
2.1. Consumers’ utility maximization 
 
 We consider a three-periods (0: childhood, 1: younger or working, and 2: older or retired) 
OLG model under monopolistic competition. It is a re-arrangement and an extension of the 
model put forth by Otaki (2007, 2009, 2015). The structure of our model is as follows.   
 1.  There is one factor of production, labor, and there is a continuum of perishable goods 
indexed by  ∈ [0,1]. Good  is monopolistically produced by firm  with constant 
returns to scale technology.  
 2.  Consumers consume the goods during the childhood period (Period 0). This 
consumption is covered by borrowing money from (employed) consumers of the younger 
generation and/or scholarship. They must repay these debts in their Period 1. However, 
unemployed consumers cannot repay their own debts. Therefore, we assume that 
unemployed consumers receive unemployment benefits from the government, which are 
covered by taxes on employed consumers of the younger generation. 
 3.  During Period 1, consumers supply  units of labor, repay the debts and save money 
for their consumption in Period 2. They also pay taxes for the pay-as-you go pension 
system for the older generation. 
 4.  During Period 2, consumers consume the goods using their savings carried over from 
their Period 1 earnings, and receive the pay-as-you go pension, which is a lump-sum 
payment. It is covered by taxes on employed consumers of the younger generation. 
 5.  Consumers determine their consumptions in Periods 1 and 2 and the labor supply at 
the beginning of Period 1. We assume that their consumption during the childhood period is 
constant.  
 Further we make the following assumptions 
Ownership of the firms Each consumer inherits ownership of the firms from the previous 
generation. Corporate profits are distributed equally to consumers of the younger 
generation.  
Zero interest rate We assume zero interest rate, and that repayment of the debts of 
consumers is assured. Consumers’ borrowing in childhood period is constant. If the savings 
of consumers in the younger period are insufficient for the borrowing, the government 
lends the scholarship to consumers in the childhood period. Consumers in the younger 
period are indifferent between lending money to childhood period consumers and savings 
by money. 
 Due to the existence of pay-as-you-go pension the savings is likely to be insufficient for 
borrowing when consumption by consumers in the childhood period is not so small.  
 
Notation  
 
We use the following notation. 
 	
: consumption basket of an employed consumer in Period ,  = 1,2. 	
: consumption basket of an unemployed consumer in Period ,  = 1,2. 
(): consumption of good  of an employed consumer in Period ,  = 1,2. 

(): consumption of good  of an unemployed consumer in Period ,  = 1,2. : consumption basket of an individual in the childhood period, which is constant. 
: the price of consumption basket in Period ,  = 1,2. 
(): the price of good  in Period ,  = 1,2.  = : (expected) inflation rate (plus one). : nominal wage rate. : unemployment benefit for an unemployed individual.  = . : consumption basket in the childhood period of a next generation consumer. : pay-as-you-go pension for an individual of the older generation. Θ: tax payment by an employed individual for the unemployment benefit.  : pay-as-you-go pension for an individual of the younger generation when he retires. Ψ: tax payment by an employed individual for the pay-as-you-go pension. Π: profits of firms which are equally distributed to each consumer. : labor supply of an individual. Γ(): disutility function of labor, which is increasing and convex. #: total employment. #$: population of labor or employment in the full-employment state.  %: labor productivity, which increases by technical change. 
 
 We assume that the population #$ is constant. We also assume that the nominal wage rate 
is constant in this section. We examine the effects of a change in the nominal wage rate in 
Section 3. 
 We consider a two-step method to solve utility maximization of consumers such that:   
 
1.  Employed and unemployed consumers maximize their utility by determining 
consumption baskets in Periods 1 and 2 given their income over two periods.  
2.  Then, they maximize their consumption baskets given the expenditure in each period.  
 
 Since the taxes for unemployed consumers’ unemployment benefits are paid by employed 
consumers of the same generation, (= ) and Θ satisfy  
 (#$ − #) = #Θ. 
This means  
 #( + Θ) = #$. 
 The price of the consumption basket in Period 0 is assumed to be 1. Thus,  is the real 
value of the consumption in the childhood period of consumers. 
 Also, since the taxes for the pay-as-you-go pension system are paid by employed consumers 
of the younger generation,  and Ψ satisfy the following relationship:  
 #Ψ = #$. 
The utility function of employed consumers of one generation over three periods is  
 )(	* , 	+ , ) − Γ(). 
We assume that )(⋅) is a homothetic utility function. The utility function of unemployed 
consumers is  
 )(	*, 	+, ). 
The consumption baskets of employed and unemployed consumers in Period  are  
 	
 = -.*/ 
()
01
0 23
0
01 ,  = 1,2, 
and  
 	
 = -.*/ 
()
01
0 23
0
01 ,  = 1,2. 
4 is the elasticity of substitution among the goods, and 4 > 1. 
 The price of consumption basket in Period  is  
 
 = -.*/ 
()*6723

10 ,  = 1,2. 
The budget constraint for an employed consumer is  
 *	* + +	+ =  + Π −  − Θ +  − Ψ. 
The budget constraint for an unemployed consumer is  
 *	* + +	+ = Π −  +  +  = Π +   (since   = ). 
Let  
 > = ?@?@A?@, 
and  
 1 − > = ?@?@A?@. 
Since the utility functions )(	* , 	+ , )  and )(	*, 	+, )  are homothetic, >  is 
determined by the relative price 

, and do not depend on the income of the consumers. 
Therefore, we have  
 > = ?@?@A?@ =
?B
?BA?B, 
and 
  1 − > = +	+*	* + +	+ =
+	+*	* + +	+ . 
From the first order conditions and the budget constraints for employed and unemployed 
consumers we obtain the following demand functions for consumption baskets.  
                   	* = > CDAE6F6GAH6I ,            (1)    
 
 	+ = (1 − >) CDAE6F6GAH6I , 
 
 	* = > EAH , 
and  
 	+ = (1 − >) EAH . 
Solving maximization problems in Step 2, the following demand functions of employed and 
unemployed consumers are derived3.  
 *() = -J(K) 3
67 L(CDAE6F6GAH6I)
 , 
  
 +() = -J(K) 3
67 (*6L)(CDAE6F6GAH6I)
 , 
  
 *() = -J(K) 3
67 L(EAH)
 , 
and  
 +() = -J(K) 3
67 (*6L)(EAH)
 . 
From these analyses we obtain the indirect utility functions of employed and unemployed 
consumers as follows:  
 M = ) -> CDAE6F6GAH6I , (1 − >) CDAE6F6GAH
6I
 , 3 − Γ(), 
and 
 M = ) -> EAH , (1 − >) EAH

 , 3. 
Let  
 N = C ,  = . 
Then, since the real value of  in the childhood period is constant, we can write  
 M = O -N + E6F6GAH6I , 3 − Γ(),   
and 
M = O PΠ + * , Q. N is the real wage rate. Denote  
 R = N + E6F6GAH6I . 
The condition for maximization of M with respect to  given  is  
 
ST
SU N − Γ′() = 0, (2) 
where  
 
ST
SU = > SS?@ + (1 − >)
S
S?@. 
Given * and  the labor supply is a function of N. From (2) we get  
 
WD
WX =
YZ
Y[ AY
Z
Y[ XD
\]](D)6YZY[ X
. 
If 
WD
WX > 0, the labor supply is increasing with respect to the real wage rate N. 
 
2.2. Firms’ profit maximization 
 
3 Calculations of the maximization problems in Step 2 are standard using Lagrange multiplier method. Please see 
Appendix abut details. 
 
 Let 2*() be the total demand for good  by younger generation consumers in Period 1. 
Then,  
 2*() = -J(K) 3
67 L^C_DA_`E6_`FA_`H6_`Ha
 . 
This is the sum of the demand of employed and unemployed consumers. Note that   is the 
pay-as-you-go pension for younger generation consumers in their Period 2. Similarly, their 
total demand for good  in Period 2 is written as  
 2+() = -J(K) 3
67 (*6L)^C_DA_`E6_`FA_`H6_`Ha
 . 
Let 2+() be the demand for good  by the older generation. Then,  
 2+() = -J(K) 3
67 (*6Lb)^Cb _cDA̅_`Eb6_`FbA_`H6_`Hca
 , 
where b , Πb , #c ,  ̅ , b  and c  are the nominal wage rate, the profits of firms, the 
employment, the individual labor supply, the debt of an individual, and the pay-as-you-go 
pension, respectively, during the previous period. >c  is the value of >  for the older 
generation. We assume >c = >.  is the pay-as-you-go pension for consumers of the older 
generation themselves. Let  
 e = (1 − >)^b #c ̅ + #$Πb − #$b + #$ − #$ca. 
This is the total savings or the total consumption of the older generation consumers including 
the pay-as-you-go pensions they receive in their Period 2. It is the planned consumption that 
is determined in Period 1 of the older generation consumers. Net savings is the difference 
between e and the pay-as-you-go pensions in their Period 2, as follows:  
 e − #$. 
Their demand for good  is written as -J(K) 3
67 f
. Government expenditure constitutes the 
national income as well as the consumptions of the younger and older generations. It is 
financed by the tax on the younger generation consumers. Then, the total demand for good  is written as  
 2() = -J(K) 3
67 g
, (3) 
where h is the effective demand defined by  
 h = >^# + #$Π − i − #$ + #$ − #$a + j + #$ + e. 
Note that  is consumption in the childhood period of a next generation consumer. j is 
the government expenditure, except for the pay-as-you-go pensions, scholarships and 
unemployment benefits, and i is the tax revenue for the government expenditure (except 
for the pay-as-you-go pensions and unemployment benefits). See Otaki (2007), (2015) about 
this demand function. 
 Let # and #  be employment and the “employment × labor supply” of firm  . The 
output of firm  is #%. At the equilibrium #% = 2(). Then, we have  
 
SW(K)
S(_D) = %. 
From (3) 
SJ(K)
SW(K) = − J(K)7W(K). 
Thus,  
 
SJ(K)
S(_D) = − J(K)l7W(K) = − J(K)l7_Dl . 
The profit of firm  is  
 m() = *()#% − #. 
The condition for profit maximization is  
 
Sn(K)
S(_D) = *()% − #% J(K)l7_Dl −  = *()% − J(K)l7 −  = 0. 
Therefore, we obtain  
 *() = *(*60)l  =
*
(*6o)l , p = *7. 
This means that the real wage rate is  
 N = (1 − p)%. 
Since all firms are symmetric,  
 * = *() = *(*6o)l . 
 
2.3. Positive or negative real balance effect with involuntary unemployment 
 
 The (nominal) aggregate supply of the goods is equal to  
 # + #$Π = *#%. 
The (nominal) aggregate demand is  >^# + #$Π − i − #$ + #$ − #$a + j + #$ + e= >q*#% − #$ + #$ − #$r + j + #$ + e. 
Since they are equal in the equilibrium,  
 *#% = >q*#% − i − #$ + #$ − #$r + j + #$ + e. (4) # cannot be larger than #$. However, it may be strictly smaller than #$. Then, we have # < #$ and involuntary unemployment exists. 
 We assume balanced budget, that is, j = i , and consider the steady state where the 
employment, the output, the nominal wage rate and the prices of the goods are constant. In 
such a state we can assume  =  and  = . Then, from (4) the savings of the younger 
generation consumers are  
 (1 − >)q*#% − j − #$r = −#$ + #$ + e = e. 
This means that the steady state with constant employment and prices is maintained by the 
balanced budget. 
 Now suppose that corresponding to the existence of involuntary unemployment the nominal 
wage rate and the prices of the goods fall at the rate  − 1 < 0. Let #′ be the employment 
in this case. If the price changes are correctly predicted by the consumers and the government, 
we can assume  =  and  = . Then, (4) is rewritten as  
 *#′% = >q*#′% − j − #$ + #$ − #$r + j + #$ + e 
The savings of the younger generation consumers are  
 (1 − >)q*#′% − j − #$ + #$ − #$r = ( − 1)(#$ + #$) + e. (5) 
We find that if  
 (1 − )(e − #$ − #$) > 0, (6) 
(5) is larger than e. Then, since the marginal propensity to consume, >, is constant, we 
have #′ > #, that is, the employment increases by a fall in the nominal wage rate. On the 
other hand, if  
 (1 − )(e − #$ − #$) < 0, (7) 
(5) is smaller than e. Then, #′ < #, and the employment decreases by a fall in the nominal 
wage rate. (6) means that the net savings of the younger generation consumers, e − #$, 
are larger than their debts, #$. In this case there exists positive real balance effect. On the 
other hand, (7) means that the net savings of the younger generation consumers are smaller 
than their debts. In that case there exists negative real balance effect. 
 The results of this paper are summarized in the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 1   
 
1.  If the net savings of the younger generation consumers are larger than their debts due 
to consumption in their childhood period, we have e − #$ − #$ > 0, and there exists 
positive real balance effect and the employment increases by a fall in the nominal wage 
rate.  
 
 2.  If the net savings of the younger generation consumers are smaller than their debts, 
we have e − #$ − #$ < 0, and there exists negative real balance effect and the 
employment decreases by a fall in the nominal wage rate.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Using a three-generations overlapping generations model, we have shown that whether the 
real balance effect is positive or negative depends on whether the net savings of consumers 
are greater or less than their debts. In this paper we assume that the goods are produced by 
only labor. In the future research we want to analyze real balance effects in situations where 
the goods are produced by capital and labor and there are investments by firms. 
 
Appendix: Calculations of the second step of consumers’ utility maximization 
 
Lagrange functions in the second step for employed and unemployed consumers are  
 ℒ* = -.*/ *()
01
0 23
0
01
 (A.1) 
 −u* v.*/ *()*()2 − >( + Π −  − Θ +  − Ψ)w, 
  
 ℒ+ = -.*/ +()
01
0 23
0
01
 
 −u+ v.*/ +()+()2 − (1 − >)( + Π −  − Θ +  − Ψ)w, 
  
 ℒ* = -.*/ *()
01
0 23
0
01 − u* v.*/ *()*()2 − >(Π + )w, 
 and  
 ℒ+ = -.*/ +()
01
0 23
0
01 − u+ v.*/ +()+()2 − >(Π + )w. 
 u*, u+ , u* and u+ are Lagrange multipliers. 
 
The first order condition for (A.1) is  
 -.*/ *()
01
0 23

01 *()60 − u**() = 0. (A.2) 
From this  
 -.*/ *()
01
0 236* *()010 = (u*)*67*()*67. 
Then,  
 -.*/ *()
01
0 236* .*/ *()
01
0 2 = (u*)*67 .*/ *()*672 = 1, 
It means  
 u* -.*/ *()*6723

10 = 1, 
and so  
 * = *x@. 
From (A.2)  
 -.*/ *()
01
0 23

01 *()010 = u**()*(). 
Then,  
 -.*/ *()
01
0 23

01 .*/ *()
01
0 2 = -.*/ *()
01
0 23
0
01
 
 = 	* = u* .*/ *()*()2 = * .*/ *()*()2. 
Therefore,  
 .*/ *()*()2 = *	* . 
Similarly,  
 .*/ +()+()2 = +	+ . 
Thus,  
 .*/ *()*()2 + .*/ +()+()2 = *	* + +	+ =  + Π −  − Θ +  − Ψ, 
and from (1) we obtain 
 *	* = >( + Π −  − Θ +  − Ψ). 
By (A.2)  
 -.*/ *()
01
0 23
0
01 *()6* = 	**()6* = (u*)7*()7 = -J(K) 3
7 . 
From this we get  
 *() = -J(K) 3
67 L(CDAE6F6GAH6I)
 . +(), *() and +() are similarly obtained. 
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